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UDC330.12.3.4/.5:044.738.5
JEL Classification: D11, D82, L15		DOI: https://doi.org/10.31617/tr.knute.2020(36)01
Anzhelika GERASYMENKO,   E-mail: Ця електронна адреса захищена від спам-ботів. вам потрібно увімкнути JavaScript, щоб побачити її. ORCID: 0000-0003-0313-6942		Doctor of Economics, Professor, Professor at the Department of Economic Theory and Competition Policy Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics 19, Kyoto str., Kyiv, 02156, Ukraine
Victoriya KOVTUN,   E-mail: svytoriya@ukr.net ORCID: 0000-0003-2956-8647		Postgraduate student at the Department of Economic Theory and Competition Policy Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics 19, Kyoto str., Kyiv, 02156, Ukraine

DEFORMATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

Background. The formation of the information economy has stimulated eco­nomic entities to form and operate artificial information asymmetry, which highlights the importance of research in this problematic area. 
Analysis of recent research and publications. Information asymmetry has become the subject of research by a number of Nobel laureates and less-known econo­mists who have studied the effects of artificial information asymmetry in the system of "principal-agent" relations, competitive, contractual relations, and so on.
The aim of the article is to determine the mechanism of influence of artificial information asymmetry on consumer demand.
Materials and methods. The research is based on the theoretical and economic analysis of scientific works of researchers of the phenomenon of information asymmetry, as well as the analytical processing of statistical data. Graphic modelling of the influence of manipulative practices of creating artificial information asymmetry on the consumer value of economic good is carried out. 
Results. Deceptive commercial practices are becoming increasingly popular in the information economy, making it possible to critically increase the consumer value of economic benefits in terms of its emotional component. At the same time, the use of digital algorithms for consumer identification and collection of consumer histories allows the most productive exploitation of the corresponding increase in consumer value, converting it into additional income by means of price personalization. 
Conclusion. Regardless of the tool used to increase information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of consumer goods, the mechanism of its deforming influence remains unchanged: the primary deformation is subjective assessment of the total utility of con­sumption of goods, which causes overestimation of the emotional component of its consumer value, resulting in deformed consumer demand, the reserve price of the corres­ponding good increases, and with it – the personalized price of its sale for the concrete consumer.
Keywords: artificial information asymmetry, deceptive advertising, consumer value, consumer demand, price personalization.

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